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We investigate the interplay between increasing inequality and consumer credit in a
complex macroeconomic system with financially fragile heterogeneous households, firms
and banks. Simulation results show that there are pros and cons of introducing con-
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1 Introduction
One of the elements that the present crisis and that of the 1930s have in common is the
increase of inequality that preceded the financial collapse of both eras. Indeed, many advanced
economies experimented a rise of both income and wealth inequality in recent decades (IMF,
2007; Atkinson et al. 2011; OECD, 2011). In particular, income inequality was relatively
low and roughly stable during the 1960s and 1970s, then it drastically increased, from the
1980s onward, to levels comparable to those of the 1920s (van Treeck, 2009). Accordingly,
rising inequality could be at the root of the present crisis, as well as the “bad distribution of
income” that was one of the major causes of Great Crash of 1929 and of the Great Depression
(Galbraith, 1959).
The rise of inequality may affect macroeconomic evolution: for instance, if consumption
grows less than proportionally with wealth, that is, if the rich consume relatively less with
respect to wealth than the poor, then increasing inequality may result in insufficient aggregate
demand. In a monetary production economy such as the capitalist system, this may lower the
profit rate, possibly resulting in lower investments and then more unemployment. Actually,
consumer credit and other forms of indebtedness can prevent this from happening for a while,
but at the cost of a growing financial instability that may increase the likelihood of a larger
unemployment crisis.
As noted by Perugini et al. (2013), a central question is whether high or rising inequality
contributed to the accumulation of unsustainable debt which, in turn, is widely recognized as
being a driver to episodes of financial instability. According to the authors, the latter notion
can be traced back to Irving Fisher who argued that all great booms and depressions are due
to “over indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after” (Fisher, 1933, p. 341).
Along these lines, Minsky (1982) developed a theory of “financial fragility”, which explains
how the seeds of financial instability are sowed during the expansionary phase: when firms’
profits are high, investment rises based on more borrowing that can be repaid using cash
flows (hedge financial position), until cash flow is not enough to repay the debt (speculative
position) and even interest (Ponzi or ultra-speculative position), and eventually the system
collapses. In a historical perspective, the Minskian model is useful in describing a secular
sequence of “manias, panics and crashes” (Kindleberger and Balibar, 2005). Consumer credit
and other forms of household finance enlarge the credit supply to the private sector. Based
on an econometric analysis of 18 OECD countries covering the period 1970-2007,1 Perugini
et al. (2013) find a significant, direct, positive relationship between income concentration
and private sector indebtedness. Moreover, they show that private sector indebtedness may
increase the probability of financial crises.
As for the US, Fazzari and Cynamon (2013) find that, disaggregating household spending,
1The dependent variable in all model specifications is the level of domestic credit to the private sector.
Data are from the World Development Indicators database
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income and saving between the top 5% and the bottom 95% of the income distribution, the
top 5% did indeed spend a smaller share of income, but the “demand drag” did not occur due
to the rise of the spending share of the bottom 95%, accompanied by a decline of their saving
rate and by a historic increase in borrowing. Moreover, they find that the unsustainable rise
in household debt was concentrated in the bottom 95% as their income share declined. “The
coincidence of rising income inequality and increasing access to credit provided the impetus
for a debt-led consumption booms” (Fazzari and Cynamon, 2013, p.11). But the increase of
household leverage led to more financial fragility and eventually the system crashed in 2007-8.
Barba and Pivetti (2009) identify similar trends when analyzing the evolution of household
debt in the US. They stress that, differently from interpretations of the phenomenon based
on the life-cycle hypothesis or in terms of erratic deviations of current income flows from their
long-run trend, rising household debt is the result of persistent changes in income distribution
and growing income inequalities. As a consequence of rising household debt, low wages seem
to be consistent with relatively high levels of aggregate demand, thus providing the solution to
the contradiction between the necessity of high and rising consumption levels (for the growth
of the system’s actual output), and the conditions of distribution which keeps within limits
the real income of the vast majority of society.
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) built a theoretical model that links inequality, household
debt and financial crises. In particular, they study how high leverage and crises can arise
as a result of changes in the income distribution. From an empirical point of view, indeed,
the periods 1920-1929 and 1983-2008 both exhibited a large increase in the income share
of the rich, a large increase in leverage for the remainder, and an eventual financial and
real crisis. The authors show that these features arise endogenously as a result of a shift in
bargaining powers over incomes.2 Related to the shift of bargaining power and changes in
income distribution, there are the macroeconomic consequences of a persistent deviation of
wage growth from productivity growth, as noted by Palley (2012) and Setterfield (2012).3
All in all, there seem to be causal links between rising inequality and the expansion of
finance, and between unsustainable indebtedness and financial crises. There could be, then, a
significant impact of inequality on financial instability and macroeconomics dynamics. This
is particularly relevant to understanding the causes of the current crisis.
“The aggregate demand deficiency preceded the financial crisis and was due to structural
changes in income distribution. Since 1980, in most advanced countries the median wage has
stagnated and inequalities have surged in favour of high incomes” (Fitoussi and Stiglitz, 2009,
p.3). In other words, “although the crisis may have emerged in the financial sector, its roots
are much deeper and lie in a structural change in income distribution that had been going
2This model has been extended by Kumhof et al. (2012) to include the foreign sector and analyze the
interplay between rising inequality, financial instability and current account imbalances in an open economy.
3For a comprehensive survey of research on the links between income inequality and the Great Recession,
see van Treeck and Sturn (2012).
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on for the past three decades” (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010, p.2). All in all, a real cause, for
example, an increase of inequality, may result in a financial crisis. Accordingly, the expansion
of finance (for instance through credit consumption) in a period of increasing inequality may
only postpone the occurrence of the crisis. “While several authors have noticed that there
might be a link between rising inequality and the crisis (e.g. Wade 2009, Rajan 2010, Stiglitz
2010), there is as of yet little systematic analysis” (Stockhammer, 2013).
“From a macroeconomic point of view, the increase in inequality triggers redistribution
from households with high propensity to consume to households with a lower propensity to
consume and/or from households credit constrained to households without such a constraint.
The reasons for this difference in the propensities may be traced back to the work of Kalecki
and Kaldor on income distribution (Kalecki, 1942; Kaldor, 1955), and it may be related to
a minimum consumption (subsistence) level, to liquidity or credit constraints, or to satiation
phenomena”(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010, p.7). “If propensities to consume differ, then the
overall propensity to consume is affected by income distribution, and an increase in inequality
causes it to decrease. The reduction of consumption demand, then, puts downward pressure
on aggregate demand and on income (unless some compensation comes from other items, like
government spending or external demand)” (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010, p.2).
Based on this literature, Russo et al. (2014) show that rising inequality results in more
volatility that, in turn, makes more likely a large crisis. A similar result can be found in
Dosi et al. (2013) in which innovation dynamics are investigated. As a matter of fact, rich
people may accumulate higher wealth while poor people may suffer from low consumption,
creating negative consequences at the macroeconomic level due to a lack of aggregate de-
mand, increasing the likelihood of observing a crisis with large unemployment. Moreover, the
“excessive” saving from the rich, through the financial intermediation of banks, may finance
more consumption of the poor.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to this stream of literature by analyzing the inter-
play between increasing inequality and consumer credit in a complex macroeconomic system
with financially fragile heterogeneous households, firms and banks. In order to analyze these
complex issues, we extend previous works, such as Riccetti et al. (2014) and Russo et al.
(2014), to investigate the impact of consumer credit on macroeconomic dynamics. In this
paper we consider that households’ consumption is characterized by “habit formation”, and
that households can have access to credit in order to finance the level of consumption ex-
ceeding own financial resources. Particularly, we focus on the role of inequality and financial
instability in moving up the tendency of the system towards the crisis, due to the decline of
the firms’ profit rate (when no counter-tendencies are taken into account).
Indeed, a possible (but temporary) solution to the problem of aggregate demand deficiency
is the availability of credit (coming from rich’s saving) to finance the consumption of poor
households. However, credit consumption can counteract the fall of the profit rate, at least for
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a certain period of time.4 However, in a context of low interest rates, the rise of indebtedness
of poor agents may amplify the financial fragility of the economic system. For instance, an
interest rate spike due to a change of the policy rate set by the central bank may lead to an
increase of the delinquency rate. Such a problem has an impact on banks’ capital: if one or
more banks are not able to absorb the rise of non-performing loans, then some agent can fail
with negative repercussions on the productive sector. Indeed, the decrease of banks’ net worth
may lead to credit rationing, so that firms cannot assume all the workers they need to produce
the desired level of commodities. Moreover, rising unemployment results in a reduction of
demand for goods, further deteriorating the financial conditions of firms. Some firms may go
bankrupt, causing a further increase of non-performing loans and possibly leading to other
bank defaults, according to a network-based financial accelerator mechanism (Delli Gatti et
al. 2010; Riccetti et al., 2013). In the worst scenario, a financial collapse happens and an
extended crisis may develop.
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 presents the model
setup: in particular, Subsection 2.1 reports the consumer credit mechanism; the evolution of
agents’ wealth is described in Subsection 2.2, while the behavior of policy makers is discussed
in Subsection 2.3. Section 3 summarizes the model findings based on Monte Carlo simulations
and sensitivity analyses. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
In what follows, we explain the main features of the model, from agents’ behavior to the
working of markets and the structure of the matching mechanism governing the decentralized
interaction among a multitude of heterogeneous agents.
Our economy evolves over a time span t = 1, 2, ..., T and it is composed of households (h =
1, 2, ..., H), firms (f = 1, 2, ..., F ), banks (b = 1, 2, ..., B), a central bank, and the government.
Agents are boundedly rational and live in an incomplete and asymmetric information context,
thus they follow simple rules of behavior and use adaptive expectations.
Agents interact in four markets: credit, labor, goods and deposit. Here, we describe the
structure and the working of markets.
• Credit market: firms and households (demand) and banks (supply) interact in the
credit market. Firm’s f credit demand Bdft at time t depends on its net worth Aft and
the leverage target lft:
Bdft = Aft · lft (1)
4According to a Marxian perspective, consumer credit and, in general, the expansion of finance can be
considered as factors that may counteract, at least for a while, the tendency of the profit rate to fall, when
the economy has reached the limit of its “material expansion” (Russo, 2014).
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The evolution of the leverage target changes according to expected profits (and in-
ventories): if expected profits are above the expected interest rate (and there are few
inventories), the firm raises its target leverage, and vice versa, as follows:
lft =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
lft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) > ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1, if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) = ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) < ift−1 or yˆft−1 ≥ ψ · yft−1
(2)
where α > 0 is the maximum percentage change of the target leverage, U(0, 1) is a
uniformly distributed random number, pift−1 is the previous period gross profit, Bft−1
is the debt of the past period, ift−1 is the nominal interest rate paid on debts, yˆft−1 are
inventories, 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is a threshold for inventories compared to past production yft−1.
(For household credit demand, see Subsection 2.1.)
Banks set their credit supply Bsbt depending on their net worth Abt, deposits Dbt, and
the quantity of money provided by the central bank mbt:
Bdbt = νbt ·min(kˆbt, k¯bt) (3)
where kˆ = γ1 · Abt, k¯ = γ2 · Abt + Dbt−1 + mbt, and νbt is a bank-specific variable for
deciding the allocation of money between private lending and government bonds. This
variable can assume values from 0 (no private lending) to 1 (no government bonds) and
it is set as follows: νbt = νbt−1 · (1± α · U(0, 1)), where a random amount is added to or
subtracted from the previous value of the variable if the ratio between the expected flow
of interests paid by firms and households and the total credit extended is higher/equal
or lower than the remuneration on government bonds, respectively.
Moreover, we assume that, if the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of
outstanding public debt, then the effective investment is proportionally rescaled (based
on the relative demand from different banks); instead, if public debt exceeds the banks’
desired amount, then the central bank buys the difference. In this way, the central
bank (in accordance with the government) can keep the interest rate on bonds as low
as desired. This clearly leads to a (partial) monetization of the public debt. All results
we will discuss below depend on this assumption of a close collaboration between the
government and the central bank in managing public debt dynamics.5 In order to
5A possible extension of the analysis would include the testing of different allocation rules between sovereign
bonds and private lending and the investigation of a different relationship between the government and the
central bank: for instance, we could assume that the central bank is not allowed to buy government bonds
on the primary market. This should be particularly relevant for analyzing the current evolution of economic
and financial conditions in the Eurozone.
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keep the model as simple as possible, we do not allow households to buy government
securities: they can only decide either to deposit money in a bank or keep money as
cash. As a consequence, the central bank plays a major role in buying government
securities, especially when when private banks reduce their demand.6
Banks have to comply with regulatory constraints, that is γ1 > 0 and 0 ≤ γ2 ≤ 1 that
represent, respectively, the maximum admissible leverage and maximum percentage of
capital to be invested in lending activities), and a credit concentration limit (that is,
banks can lend to a single firm up to a maximum fraction β of the total amount of the
credit Bdbt).
Finally, the bank b charges an interest rate on loans to the firm f or household h
according to the following equation:
ibft = i
CB
t + iˆbt + i¯xt (4)
where iCBt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank, iˆbt is a bank-specific
component, and i¯xt = ρ
lxt/100 is a firm-specific (in this case x = f) or a household
specific component (x = h), that is, a risk premium on the firm f or household h target
leverage lxt,
7 and ρ is a positive parameter. The bank-specific component decreases if
the bank does not manage to lend all the credit supply to firms and vice versa.
• Labor market: firms and government (demand side) and households (supply side)
interact in the labor market. On the demand side, the government hires a fraction
g of households picked at random from the whole population. The remaining part is
available for working in private firms. The wage bill paid by firm f is financed by net
worth and bank credit: Aft+Bft. Thus, labor demand relies on retained profits and the
target leverage (see Equation 2). This means that labor demand depends on expected
profits, which include the expected demand for goods and production costs (based on
adaptive expectations). Then, the firm compares the expected profit with financial costs
(the interest rate on bank loans): if the former is higher than the latter, then the firm
increases the labor demand, and vice versa.
On the supply side, each worker posts a wage wht that increases if he was employed
in the previous period, and vice versa. Moreover, the required wage has a minimum
related to the price of a good. As a result of the decentralized matching between labor
supply and demand, each firm ends up with a number of workers nft and a residual
cash (insufficient to hire an additional worker) and a fraction of households may remain
unemployed. The wage of unemployed people is set equal to zero.
6This is another assumption we could remove in a future work in which the whole mechanism of portfolio
allocation for private agents (that is, households, firms and banks) and the operation of policy makers are
better implemented.
7The target leverage is the ratio between required credit and firm’s net worth (x = f) or household’s
wealth (x = h)
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• Goods market: households (demand side) and firms (supply side) interact in the goods
market. On the demand side, households set the desired consumption on the basis of
their disposable income, wealth and bank credit. (See Subsection 2.1 for details on the
consumption function.)
Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers as follows:
yft = φ · nft (5)
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter. They put their current period production and
previous period inventories yˆft−1 in the goods market. The selling price increases if in
the previous period the firm managed to sell all the output, while it reduces if it has
positive inventories:
pft =
8
<
:
pft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 = 0
pft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 > 0
(6)
Moreover, the minimum price at which the firm wants to sell its output is set such that
it is at least equal to the average cost of production. As a consequence of the interaction
between supply and demand sides in the goods market, each household ends up with a
residual cash that is not enough to buy additional goods and that he will try to deposit
in a bank. At the same time, firms may remain with unsold goods (inventories) that
they will try to sell in the next period.
• Deposit market: banks (demand) and households (supply) interact in the deposit
market. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits according to their funds’ requirement:
iDbt =
8
<
:
iDbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt > 0
min{iDbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , iCBt}, if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt = 0
(7)
where Γbt is the amount of public debt bought by bank b at time t. If a bank exhausts the
credit supply (by lending to private firms, households or government), then it decides
to increase the interest rate paid on deposits to attract new depositors, and vice versa.
However, the interest rate on deposits can increase until a maximum given by the policy
rate iCBt , which is the rate at which banks could refinance from the central bank.
Households set the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as
follows:
iDit =
8
<
:
iDit−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Dit−1 = 0
iDit−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Dit−1 > 0
(8)
where Dit−1 is the individual i’s deposit in the previous period. Accordingly, households
that in the previous period found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the
desired one decide to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, if they do not
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find a bank satisfying their requirements, they reduce the minimum rate at which they
would deposit money. We assume that each household deposits all the available money
in a single bank that offers the required interest rate.
Finally, the interaction mechanism that matches the demand and the supply sides of the
four markets follows a common decentralized matching protocol. In particular, interaction
develops in the following way: a random list of agents on the demand side is set, then the
first agent on the list observes a random subset of potential counterparts on the supply side,
the size of which depends on a parameter 0 < χ ≤ 1 (that proxies the degree of imperfect
information), and chooses the cheapest one. After that, the second agent on the list performs
the same activity on a new random subset of the updated potential partner list. The process
iterates until the end of the demand side list. Subsequently, a new random list of agents in
the demand side is set and the whole matching mechanism continues until either one side
of the market (demand or supply) is empty or no further matchings are feasible because the
highest bid (for example, the money available to the richest firm) is lower than the lowest ask
(for example, the lowest wage asked by unemployed workers).
2.1 Households: consumption demand, credit demand and wealth
evolution
Households set their desired consumption on the basis of their disposable income, wealth,
and past consumption. In particular, they compare the level of consumption deriving from
their propensity to consume income and wealth, that is c∗ht = c1 · wht−1 + c2 · Aht−1, where
0 < c1 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume income, 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume
the wealth Aht−1, with how much they consumed before, cht−1. Then, they choose the larger
one: cdht = max{c
∗
ht, cht−1}. Accordingly, households are characterized by habit formation
in consumption behavior. Moreover, we assume that, if the amount cdht is smaller than the
maximum price of one good p¯, then cdht = p¯; that is the household would like to buy at least
one good (independently of previous behavioral rules).
By introducing consumer credit, we allow households to borrow the money needed to
finance consumption exceeding their financial resources. Therefore, if the household does not
have enough money to buy the amount cdht, he can ask for credit from one or more banks
(according to the usual matching mechanisms). The amount of required credit is equal to the
difference between cdht and available funds (income plus wealth). However, households also
look at the financial costs of consumer credit; they demand less credit if the interest rate to
be paid on consumer credit is high, and vice versa, according to the following equation:
ccdht = max{0, µ · c
d
ht · (1− r
cc
t−1)− (wht−1 + Aht−1)} (9)
where rcct−1 is the (past period) mean interest rate on consumer credit, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 is a
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parameter.8 The presence of the term (1− rcct−1) in Equation 9 is a simple way to introduce a
negative relation between the demand for consumer credit and its price, i.e. the interest rate.
After the interaction in the credit market, households go to the goods market with an
amount c¯dht to be spent equal to c
d
ht if they do not need consumer credit or if banks lend all
the required credit, while it is a lower amount equal to the sum of disposable income, wealth
and (possibly) bank credit if they ask for consumer credit and do not (fully) obtain it.
After purchasing goods, households try to deposit their savings. Savings are composed
of the employed workers income (net of taxes) plus consumer credit (if asked and received),
plus the previous period wealth, plus the interest received on the previous period deposits
(if present), plus previous period dividends from firms and banks,9 less the cost of effective
consumption, less the interest paid on previous period consumer credit (if present), less tax
on wealth.10
Finally, households linked to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits (see next
Subsection for details). In the same way, if a household goes bankrupt, the banks that lent
money lose a fraction of provided credit. In general, a “loss given default rate” (LGDR)
can be computed for each agent (household, firm or bank) going bankrupt, which is equal to
−A/B, where A is the agent’s net worth that is negative in the case of default, and B is the
debt. For example, consider a bankrupted agent with net worth A = −10 and debt B = 100:
the agent has a cash amount of 90 that can be employed partially to fulfill the debt. The
LGDR is then equal to 10% or, equally, the “recovery rate” (RR) is (−A+B)/B, in this case
90%.
2.2 Profits, dividends and wealth dynamics of firms and banks
At the end of the interactions in the four markets, every firm f and bank b calculates its
profit.
Firm profits are equal to revenues, pft · y¯ft, where pft is the price set by the firm f on its
goods, and y¯ft is the number of sold goods), less the sum of wages paid to employed workers
and the sum of interests paid on bank loans. Firms pay taxes and distribute a percentage
δft of positive profits as dividends to households. The fraction 0 ≤ δft ≤ 1 goes down if in
the previous period the firm produced and sold all the goods (no inventories, then it wants
to retain a larger share of profits to enlarge production), and vice versa.11
8Remember that the interest rate set by the bank b on the credit extended to household h at time t is
computed according to Equation 4 based on the same procedure for both firms and households.
9Net of the amount needed for new entrant firms and banks replacing defaulted ones, see next Subsection;
the fraction of dividends obtained by household h is proportional to the household h’s wealth compared with
overall households’ wealth.
10Only applied on wealth exceeding a threshold that is a multiple of the average goods price.
11The assumption that dividends only depend on investment needs may seem restrictive, for instance because
firms do not change the payout policy during a crisis. However, there is ample literature supporting the fact
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Bank profits are equal to interest gained on lending to non-defaulted firms and households,
plus interest obtained on government securities, less the interests paid to depositors and
Central Bank, and less the bad debt due to bankrupted agents. As for firms, banks pay
taxes and distribute dividends on positive profits. The dividend fraction 0 ≤ δbt ≤ 1 evolves
according to the following rule: if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of
credit then it decides to distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested
profits), and vice versa.
The profit is added (or subtracted, in the case of a loss) to the previous period firm’s
wealth Aft−1 or bank’s wealth Abt−1 and the new amount of wealth is computed.
If Aft ≤ 0, then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant replaces the bankrupted agent
according to a one-to-one replacement. Banks linked to defaulted firms lose a fraction of their
loans, but recover the remaining part with a recovery rate equal to (Aft +Bft)/Bft.
If Abt ≤ 0, then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place. Households linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits (the loss given default rate is calculated
as 1− (Abt +Dbt)/Dbt).
The new entrant (firm or bank) starts with an initial net worth equal to a multiple of the
average goods price and the money needed to finance entrants is subtracted from households’
wealth (proportionally to their resources).12
2.3 Government and central bank
Government’s current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to public workers and
the interests paid on public debt. Moreover, government collects taxes on incomes and wealth
and receives interest gained by the central bank. The difference between expenditures and
revenues gives rise to the public deficit Ψt. Consequently, public debt is Γt = Γt−1 +Ψt.
13
The presence of the government as an acyclical sector is a very important feature of the model.
that the payout policy has been increasingly oriented to the maximization of the shareholder value and not so
much to liquidity or solvency problems that can emerge during a crisis. This holds both for firms and banks.
For instance, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) show that non-financial corporations has been characterized by
a shift from a retain and reinvest strategy to a downsize and distribute strategy. Moreover, over the decade
2001-2010, the corporations in the S&P 500 Index distributed the 40% of their profits on cash dividends, but
also another 54% on stock buybacks (Lazonick, 2013). Finally, the literature highlights that even when the
financial crisis started and the banking system suffered the depletion of common equity through losses, banks
continued to pay dividends, in spite of widely anticipated credit losses, because high dividend payments signal
to the market the soundness of the bank (see, for instance, Acharya et al., 2011 and Brogi, 2010).
12In case private wealth is not enough, then government intervenes. (However, this never happens in the
simulations we present in the paper.)
13The evolution of public deficit (and debt) depends on the parameter setting. We choose parameter values
such that the public deficit to gdp ratio oscillates around 3% (in normal times). As a consequence, the public
debt to gdp ratio, which initially increases, tends to stabilize after a while, such as when the growth of nominal
gdp due to inflation is above the growth rate of public debt.
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Table 1: Parameter setting, baseline model.
H number of individuals 500
F number of firms 80
B number of banks 10
α adjustment parameter 0.05
χ matching imperfect information 0.2
ψ inventory threshold 0.1
γ1 max bank’s leverage 10
γ2 max % of bank’s invested capital in lending 0.5
β max bank’s lending to single firm 0.1
ρ risk premium on loans 2
c1 propensity to consume current income 0.8
c2 propensity to consume wealth 0.3
φ firm’s productivity 3
τ tax rate on income 0.3
g % of public workers on population 0.3
µ consumer credit parameter 0
Indeed, hiring public workers, the government provides a fraction of the aggregate demand.
In this way, it partially stabilizes the economy by reducing output volatility.
The central bank decides the policy rate iCBt and the quantity of money to put into the
system in accordance with the interest rate. In order to do that, the central bank observes
the aggregate excess supply or demand in the credit market and sets an amount of money
Mt to reduce the gap in the subsequent period of time. Model dynamics are influenced by
the assumptions we made about the operation of the government and the central bank. The
fundamental hypothesis is that the two policy makers collaborate strictly in managing the
public debt; indeed, the central bank is committed to buy outstanding government securities.
3 Model results
The dynamics of the model are studied by means of computer simulation. In what follows,
we present and discuss simulation results. Consider that the model focuses on business cycle
fluctuations. We perform a short/medium run analysis; we do not consider factors underlying
long run growth (for instance, labor and capital productivity).
As for the basic mechanisms of our artificial macroeconomy (see also Riccetti et al., 2014),
we observe the emergence of endogenous business cycles with the following pattern: an increase
in firms’ profit determines an expansion of production resulting in more employment and,
if banks extend the required credit, this effect could be further amplified; the fall of the
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unemployment rate increases wage inflation that, on the one hand, expands the aggregate
demand, while, on the other hand, reducing firms’ profit, possibly causing an inversion of the
business cycle. Then, there is a dynamic relationship between unemployment and the profit
rate, enlarged by a financial accelerator mechanism. Business fluctuations are mitigated by
the government (an acyclical sector) that plays a central role in reducing the output volatility
through stabilizing aggregate demand. The system can remain trapped in large and extended
crises: wage reduction due to growing unemployment does not reverse the cycle, but generates
a lack of aggregate demand that amplifies the recession in a vicious circle for which the fall
of purchasing power prevents firms from selling commodities. Firms decrease production,
unemployment continues to rise, and the recession further deteriorates.
In this paper we want to understand how the presence of consumer credit influences
the dynamics of the model. We focus on the unemployment rate, given that it is perfectly
related to real GDP (i.e., we assumed that firms have fixed productivity). First of all, we run
simulations for a time span of T = 500 periods, based on the parameter setting reported in
Table 1. In particular, we focus on a comparison between two “extreme” cases: (i) a baseline
scenario with no consumer credit (µ = 0), and (ii) a computational treatment that considers
the presence of consumer credit (µ = 1). In the second part of this section, we provide some
sensitivity analyses to study the impact of different levels of consumer credit (with values of
µ from 0 to 1 with step 0.1) on macroeconomic dynamics. Some policy implications emerge.
3.1 Monte Carlo analysis: Baseline scenario vs. consumer credit
We perform two Monte Carlo (hereafter MC) analyses (with the same initial random seeds),
running 500 simulations in each. In the first analysis, we use a model without consumer credit
(hereafter CC): desired consumption cannot exceed the sum of household disposable income
and wealth. In the second one, we allow household borrowing to finance consumption.
Figure 1 shows the time evolution of the unemployment rate in the two computational
treatments: (i) the baseline model (without CC) and (ii) the model with CC. In particular, we
perform 1000 MC simulations, 500 runs without CC and 500 with CC, and then we compute
the unemployment rate for each time t as the average of the unemployment rates across the
MC simulations for each of the two scenarios. We also compute the mean absolute deviation
for each t and then use it to add error bars around the mean unemployment rate.
For a certain period of time, the unemployment rate is smaller when households can finance
(a fraction of) consumption through credit that sustains the aggregate demand. For instance,
the unemployment rate for the model with CC (solid line in Figure 1) is below the level of
the baseline scenario (dashed line in Figure 1), almost half of the whole simulation period.
Indeed, a reduction of aggregate demand, for instance, due to a rise of unemployment, has
different effects on an economy with or without CC. When households have access to credit to
finance consumption, a decrease of aggregate demand can be counteracted by more household
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Figure 1: Monte Carlo analysis, 500 simulations without CC (solid line) and 500 simulations
with CC (dashed line). For each time period t, we calculated the average value of the unem-
ployment rate (and the corresponding mean absolute deviations to add the ±mad interval)
across 500 Monte Carlo replications for each of the two scenarios.
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Figure 2: Monte Carlo analysis, 500 simulations with CC. For each time period t, we calculated
the average value of the cross-correlation between consumer credit and unemployment.
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debt. In particular, the rate of unemployment is positively correlated with consumer credit,
as shown in Figure 2, at lag0 and lag -1.14 This suggests that more unemployment results
in an extended access to consumer credit. There is also a slight negative correlation at lag
+1, suggesting that an increase of consumer credit makes unemployment decline. The main
feature is, however, that for a quite long time the economy with CC performs better than
the system with no CC. Nevertheless, for successive periods, the unemployment rate tends
to rise and the economy evolves towards a large crisis. A similar tendency characterizes the
evolution of the unemployment rate for the model without CC, although the economy takes
a longer time to evolve towards a large crisis.15
The underlying mechanisms are the same in the two cases (as well as in the basic case
14Cross-correlations are computed by averaging values across MC simulations for the period from t = 101
to t = 200, before the large crisis.
15In particular, all the simulations with CC converge to a complete crash of the private economy: when
approaching the end of the simulation period, the level of unemployment is always 70% in the CC scenario
because no more firms demand labor and only a fraction g=0.3 of households are employed by the public
sector; consequently, there is no more dispersion around the mean value of unemployment and the mean
absolute deviation is zero.
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analyzed in Riccetti et al., 2014) as shown, for instance, by the emergence of the Phillips
curve, meaning an inverse relation between the unemployment rate and wage inflation (see
Figure 3):16 the only significant difference introduced by consumer credit is that the average
unemployment rate is lower and the average wage inflation higher, compared to the “no CC”
scenario.
The presence of consumer credit leads to a lower average value of the public deficit to gdp
ratio (almost 3%) compared to the no CC case (slightly above 4%). Obviously, this causes a
public debt to gdp ratio which is lower with CC (around 133%) than without it (200%). In
both cases, however, the central bank plays a fundamental role in managing macroeconomic
conditions through debt monetization. Consider, indeed, that the fraction of public debt held
by private banks is around 20% in both the baseline and the CC scenario. The remaining part
is bought by the central bank. This is also due to the simplifing assumption that households
are not allowed to buy government securities.
However, after a beneficial effect on the macroeconomy, the presence of consumer credit
introduces more instability, as we can see observing both the enlargement of error bars in
Figure 1 and the increase of macroeconomic volatility (as measured by the average value of
the mean absolute deviation of unemployment rates across MC simulations) displayed in the
upper-left panel of Figure 4. However, household debt causes instability only after a certain
period during which the economic system is as stable as (or even more stable than) in the
“no CC” case.
A fundamental difference between the two scenarios regards the degree of inequality. The
introduction of consumer credit allows households to buy more goods, based on the consump-
tion function with habit formation, overcoming the budget constraint due to own financial
resources. This boosts the aggregate demand, resulting in a lower unemployment rate. As
time elapses, however, the payment of interests on household debt reduces their wealth that
causes a reduction of consumption (remember that desired consumption depends positively
on both income and wealth). As a consequence, households may ask for more consumer
credit and, if banks allow households to borrow more, consumption may remain stable or
even increase, despite the reduction of household wealth. But this leads to a further reduc-
tion of wealth for indebted households that eventually results in higher inequality. All in all,
simulations with CC exhibit more inequality (as measured by the Gini index computed on
households’ wealth) compared with the “no CC” scenario (see upper-right panel in Figure 4).
The rise of inequality, along with an expansion of credit implying a larger financial lever-
age of the banking sector (see bottom-left panel in Figure 4), creates the basis for a large
crisis that happens before and with a stronger magnitude than in the “no CC” scenario. All
in all, the presence of consumer credit accelerates the tendency of the economic system to-
16In this figure, we consider only the period of time from t = 101 to t = 200, the stable phase before the
crisis.
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Figure 3: Monte Carlo analysis, 500 simulations without CC (circles) and 500 simulations with
CC (stars). For each time period t in the time interval 101-200 we calculated the average
value of the unemployment rate and of wage inflation, across 500 Monte Carlo replications
for each of the two scenarios.
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
0.014
0.015
0.016
0.017
0.018
0.019
0.02
0.021
0.022
0.023
unemployment rate
w
a
ge
 in
fla
tio
n
no CC
with CC
17
Figure 4: Monte Carlo analysis, 500 simulations without CC (solid line) and 500 simulations
with CC (dashed line). For each time period t, we calculated the average value of the (i)
unemployment volatility, (ii) Gini index on households’ wealth, (iii) banks’ exposure (the
ratio between effective credit to firms and households and own capital), and (iv) firms’ profit
rate (the ratio between net profits and own capital), across 500 Monte Carlo replications for
each of the two scenarios.
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wards the crisis.17 Therefore, there are pros and cons of introducing consumer credit in the
macroeconomy.
The tendency towards the crisis is related to the dynamics of the productive sector’s profit
rate. The bottom-right panel in Figure 4 displays the time evolution of the mean values (for
each time t across 500 MC simulations for each treatment) of firms’ profit rate in the two
scenarios. As a consequence, the profit rate of the banking system declines, even though
its level is higher in the CC case than in the “no CC” scenario due to the interest paid by
households on their debt. This pattern characterizes the stable phase of the model, during
which the average unemployment rate with CC is lower than in the basic case. The same holds
for firms that face a higher level of aggregate demand because of the presence of consumer
credit. As the profit rate approaches zero, firms tend to decrease the demand of credit to
finance production (they prefer to distribute dividends to stakeholders). There is then a
process of deleveraging along with the tendency of the economy towards the crisis.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis for different levels and timings of consumer
credit
In this subsection, we perform a sensitivity analysis on the parameter µ (see Equation 9). In
other words, we want to explore the effects of introducing higher levels of consumer credit.
Accordingly, we consider various scenarios with different values of the parameter µ: from 0
to 1 with a step 0.1. Figure 5 reports the time evolution of the average unemployment rate
(calculated across 100 Monte Carlo simulations for each value of the parameter): higher levels
of µ result in more unemployment, even though there is a non-linear relation. It seems as
though intermediate levels perform worse than low or high levels of consumer credit; in fact,
the high value of mean unemployment is mainly due to the final period of large crises.
When we investigate macroeconomic dynamics during a stable phase, for instance, from
t=101 to t=200, things change. As shown in Figure 6, the average unemployment rate (calcu-
lated across 100 MC simulations for each value of µ from 0 to 1 with step 0.1) when households
have access to consumer credit is always smaller than in the case with “no CC” (when µ =
0). This confirms that CC has a positive effect on the macroeconomic system for a quite long
period of time, before accelerating the tendency of the system towards the crisis. Perhaps it is
the presence of CC more than its level that has a major impact on macroeconomic evolution
(almost independently of the value of µ).
Moreover, the presence of CC and its level as modulated by the parameter µ has different
effects on aggregate demand and on the tendency towards the crisis depending on when it
17Consider that the model takes a quite long time before that a large crisis emerges. Moreover, we do not
introduce any counter-tendency, such as a public intervention based on a large investment plan, an institutional
change, technological innovation, and so on. In those cases the economy should recover and work for many
other periods. This is what we will investigate in a future version of the model incorporating long-run factors.
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Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis, 100 simulations for each value of the parameter µ from 0 to 1
by step 0.1. For each value of µ, we calculated the average value of the unemployment rate
across the whole simulation period.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis, 100 simulations for each value of the parameter µ from 0 to 1
by step 0.1. For each value of µ, we calculated the average value of the unemployment rate
for 100 time period representing a stable macroeconomic phase, from t=101 to t=200.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis, introducing CC at different time steps, at t =50, 100, 200, and
400. Plots show the time evolution of the average unemployment rate (calculated across 100
MC simulations for each case). CC is introduced at time (i) t = 50 in the upper-left panel,
(ii) t = 100 in the upper-right panel, (iii) t = 200 in the bottom-left panel, and (iv) t = 400
in the bottom-right panel. A vertical line separates the evolution of the unemployment rate
before and after the introduction of CC.
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is introduced in the system. In Figure 7, we can find four different timings. Starting with
the model without CC at time t = 1, we introduce CC at time (i) t = 50 (upper-left panel),
(ii) t = 100 (upper-right panel), (iii) t = 200 (bottom-left panel), and (iv) t = 400 (bottom-
right plot). Let’s consider the case (i): after the introduction of CC, there is a decline of the
unemployment rate (calculated as the average for each time period across 100 MC simulations)
and, after quite a long period, a large crisis develops. A similar story happens in cases (ii)
and (iii), even though the period before the crisis is shorter. When CC is introduced too late,
for instance, when the system is already on the path towards the crisis, as in case (iv), there
is a sudden drop of the unemployment rate and a large crisis erupts.
Finally, observing the time evolution of household wealth (in real terms) in Figure 8, we
can see that the introduction of CC, which allows households to finance a level of consumption
exceeding their own financial resources, results in a lower average wealth (and a more unequal
distribution, as explained before). At the same time, another part of the economy benefits
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Figure 8: Monte Carlo analysis, 100 simulations for each value of the parameter µ from 0 to
1 by step 0.1. For each value of µ, we calculated the average real value of households’ wealth
for 100 time period representing a stable macroeconomic phase, from t=101 to t=200.
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from the introduction of CC, namely the financial system. Indeed, the banks’ profit rate is
quite higher when CC is allowed, for all levels of the parameter µ, as shown in Figure 8.
All in all, when households have access to consumer credit, they can enjoy a higher level of
consumption that boosts the aggregate demand and decreases unemployment. This positive
effect on the macroeconomy can hold for a quite long period of time. But the payment of
interests results in lower wealth for households. Then, the rise of inequality and the increase
of financial fragility eventually leads to a large and extended crisis. However, while household
wealth declines, consumer credit allows banks to expand their activity, thus creating new
opportunities for making financial profits. Before the crisis erupts, then, the banks’ profit
rate is higher than in the “no CC” scenario. Under these circumstances, the decision over
the introduction of CC depends both on the worthiness of allowing households to expand
consumption through debt, and on a policy trade-off: is it the case to accelerate the tendency
towards the crisis (due to the rise of inequality and financial fragility), thereby, granting
a higher profit rate to banks? Obviously, the scope of the analysis and of policy issues
is limited by model assumptions and also by the fact that we do not consider any possible
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Figure 9: Monte Carlo analysis, 100 simulations for each value of the parameter µ from 0 to
1 by step 0.1. For each value of µ, we calculated the average value of the banks’ profit rate
for 100 time period representing a stable macroeconomic phase, from t=101 to t=200.
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counter-tendency to the decline of firms’ profit rate that could restore a stable macroeconomic
environment (at least for a while). This could be the subject of future investigations.
4 Concluding remarks
We presented an agent-based macroeconomic model to investigate the role of consumer credit
on macroeconomic dynamics. The model is composed of heterogeneous agents (households,
firms and banks) that interact according to a fully decentralized matching mechanism. The
matching protocol is common to all markets (goods, labor, credit, deposits) and represents a
best partner choice in a context of imperfect information. The model gives rise to emergent
business cycle fluctuations. Moreover, model simulations highlight the fact that even large
crises can endogenously emerge when a strong reduction of real wages leads to a fall of
the aggregate demand that, in turn, induces firms to decrease production, so enlarging the
unemployment rate, in a vicious (positive feedback) circle. In these cases, the system may
remain trapped in a large unemployment situation, without the possibility spontaneously to
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recover unless an exogenous intervention occurs.
In this paper, we focused on consumer credit and its impact on macroeconomic evolution.
According to van Treeck (2013), to understand the effects of changes in the distribution of
permanent income on consumption and saving decisions, the permanent income hypothesis
should be abandoned in favor of the old consumption theory proposed by Duesenberry (1943).
This theory suggests that the current level of consumption is a function of the maximum con-
sumption reached in a past period, which thus acts as a reference point for households. We
considered a very simple case in which household consumption is characterized by “habit
formation”: they just look at the previous level of consumption. As a future development
of our modelling framework, we could improve the implementation of consumption behavior,
for instance, by considering that agents can have a longer memory than just one period.
Moreover, we could also implement imitation among households when deciding on consump-
tion expenditure or a “keeping up with the Joneses” behavior.18
In our artificial macroeconomy, consumer credit can be introduced to allow an expansion of
consumption, mitigating the financial constraints for (some) households. The analysis shows
that, for a certain period of time, the unemployment rate is lower when households can finance
consumption through consumer credit. Indeed, this creates an additional source of aggregate
demand. Nevertheless, for successive periods, the unemployment rate tends to rise and the
economy evolves towards a large crisis. A similar tendency characterizes the evolution of the
unemployment rate for the model without consumer credit, although the economy takes a
longer time to evolve towards a large crisis.
On the one hand, consumer credit allows households to buy more goods; this boosts
the aggregate demand and results in a lower unemployment rate. On the other hand, as
time elapses, the payment of interest on household debt reduces their wealth, which causes a
reduction of consumption. As a consequence, households may ask for more consumer credit
and, if banks allow households to borrow more, consumption may remain stable or even
increase, despite the reduction of household wealth. But this leads to a further reduction of
wealth for indebted households that eventually results in higher inequality.
The joint effect of rising inequality and financial fragility when consumer credit is allowed
makes happen the crisis earlier than in the baseline scenario. The tendency towards the
crisis is related to the dynamics of the productive sector’s profit rate. As the profit rate
approaches zero, firms tend to decrease the demand of credit to finance production (they
prefer to distribute dividends to stakeholders). There is then a process of deleveraging along
18Although the empirical evidence seems to be against this hypothesis, at least for the US. Indeed, Coibion
et al. (2014) investigate whether borrowing patterns on the part of low-, middle-, and high-income households
differed depending on local income inequality (where local refers to the geographical dimension, that is, the
ZIP code). The authors maintain that local inequality is the most relevant metric for “keeping up with
the Joneses”. On these bases, they find that banks channel more credit toward lower-income applicants in
low-inequality regions than the high-inequality regions.
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with the tendency of the economy towards the crisis. However, before the crisis erupts, while
household wealth decreases due to the payment of interest on debts, the banks’ profit rate is
higher than in the baseline model. This means that, under the assumption made and given
that we do not consider counter-tendencies to the decline of the real sector’s profit rate, the
evaluation on the impact of consumer credit is subject to policy considerations. Moreover,
the conditions of financial fragility and growing inequality may have an impact on long-run
performance through influencing firms’ investment decisions, and then capital accumulation,
as well as the innovation process based on R&D expenditure. This is one of the topics we
want to investigate in the next future.
Our aim is indeed to improve further our macroeconomic setting in order to develop a
useful tool for interpreting the evolution of economic and financial conditions and to analyze
policy issues. Then we will work on a demanding research agenda:
• test the consequences of alternative assumptions, such as labor market rigidity, hetero-
geneous consumption/saving behavior, etc.;
• refine the model with a varying number of actors (firms and banks) and different timings
(and frequency) for taking decisions in the various markets;
• extend the model by introducing new markets, for instance, the stock and bond markets,
the interbank market, and a market for investment goods;
• extend the model with long-run growth factors (heterogeneous workers’ skills, R&D
investments, etc.);
• work on policy experiments (for instance, a progressive tax on wealth that could finance
public expenditure to restore macroeconomic stability – and industrial policy to support
innovation in an extended model with long-run growth);
Obviously, these items are strictly related. When we extend the model, we will also be
able to test for further alternative assumptions and different parameter settings (based on
an empirical calibration of the the model), and then we will assess more detailed policy
experiments.
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